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Managers, not markets  
 
Neoliberal policy owes less to the ideology of free-markets than it does the planning 
techniques born in Cold War America.  
 
Sahil Jai Dutta, Samuel Knafo, Richard Lane, Steffan Wyn-Jones 
 
A tale of two think tanks  
 
One enduring myth about the triumph of neoliberalism1 is the role of the Mont Pelerin Society (MPS). 
Its founding members and 1947 'Statement of Aims' are thought to have laid the foundations for an 
ideological hegemony that has defined politics for the last four decades.  
 
But look beyond the rhetoric of Friedrich Hayek, Milton Friedman and their MPS colleagues and it's 
actually a different think tank that matters. The Cold War RAND Corporation, founded in 1948 by the 
US Airforce and weapons manufacturer Douglas Aircraft, incubated the tools and techniques that 
encoded neoliberalism into contemporary life. Over the decades that followed the second world war, 
researchers at RAND turned the study of planning and managing warfare into a blueprint for planning 
and managing society2.  
 
Unlike the highly idealised, abstract principles of freedom that occupied the MPS, RAND was in the 
business of constructing tools policymakers could actually use. RAND developed a celebrated gallery 
of twentieth century intellectuals (including 23 Economic Nobel Prizewinners) who laid the technical 
foundation for contemporary policymaking.  
 
Many of these researchers were mathematicians or Keynesian economists. Though ferociously 
opposed to soviet socialism, their vision was less about free markets than it was about planning. RAND 
researchers recognised the market as something to be organised for the purpose of making policy – 
not the opposite, as the MPS idealists imagined. That in reality the reforms made by neoliberal 
policymakers never matched the free-market theory of Hayek and his colleagues is well known. Yet 
too often the mismatch is explained because of a partial or failed implementation of that aim for market 
rule. Rather than markets and the MPS, we should look to the RAND-based, managerial roots of 
neoliberal policy.  
 
By putting the ideological rhetoric of neoliberalism to one side, and focussing instead on the technical 
apparatus of public management, we can get a clearer grasp of how neoliberal policies are made and 
how they can be resisted.	
Remaking Management 
 
It is easy to conflate this focus on the managerial roots of neoliberalism with the familiar idea of 
technocratic governance. Whether central bank independence or EU fiscal compatibility rules, 
neoliberal governance has always made use of bodies with limited democratic oversight. But the 
managerial roots of neoliberalism are not simply an extension of Weber’s iron-cage, bureaucratic 
rationality. Instead, RAND re-invented management practices, traditionally focused on control, to turn 
them into tools for decision-making. This is best understood by contrasting neoliberal managerialism 
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with what went before.  
 
 
A management revolution: From scientific management to neoliberal managerialism  
 Scientific management Neoliberal managerial governance 
Key period  1880s - 1930s 1940s - 1990s 
Key institutions  Ford, GM RAND 
Key targets  Improving efficiency Policymaking 
Key expertise  Engineers, accountants  Mathematicians, economists 
Key focus Micro, producer level Macro, strategic level  
Key goal Optimisation: absolute gains Gaming: relative gains 
Information Measurement: backward looking  Modelling: predictive and forward looking  
Budgeting 
approach 
Accounting: backward looking Economics: predictive and forward looking 
 
 
Before the RAND-centred revolution, there was the scientific management of nineteenth century US 
manufacturing. This was the period in which the belief in and intense focus on the promise of 
management to deliver social improvement began. ‘Scientific managers’ trained as engineers and 
accountants were expected to improve factory efficiency through better measurement, benchmarking 
and standardisation. They were technicians deeply involved in operations and working close to the 
ground, often organising the micro processes of production. But they had no role in the macro questions 
of overall corporate strategy. Instead, a class of administrators at the top of corporations set broad 
organisational policies and objectives, which managers were tasked with carrying out as efficiently as 
possible.  
 
What developed at RAND was far more ambitious than the programmes of Frederick Taylor, Henry 
Ford and the American industrial managers who followed them. In contrast to relying on an art of 
administration to set strategic goals, RAND wanted to develop a science of top-level decision-making: 
rigorous, formalised and technical. The technologies of management that emerged were designed to 
mathematically model executive decisions and ground them in apparently objective facts.  
 
It was an ambition that drew not from the needs of profit-maximising private industry, but from the 
necessity of organising and refining America’s cold war strategy. RAND had been established precisely 
to capitalise on the innovations in statistical analysis and military planning made during the second 
world war.3 Weapons systems analysis (soon renamed systems analysis) was its key development. 
And from this sprang many of the neoliberal managerial techniques that revolutionised the public sector 
over the second half of the twentieth century. Understanding the key features of managerial 
governance is crucial if progressives are to decode neoliberalism.  
 
Systems analysis and the birth of neoliberal managerialism 
 
Key to systems analysis was its reliance on modelling social systems and its strategic framing of 
decision-making.  
 
Mathematical modelling was used to predict and compare the effectiveness of different possible 
courses of action. At first, this was about determining military strategy: choosing what weapons systems 
to deploy and where. Later, these models were repurposed for civilian planning. They allowed top-level 
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strategists to experiment with manipulating different parameters in order to establish the potential pay-
offs of different strategies.  
 
Crucial to this was the integration of linear and dynamic programming, sequential analysis and 
Bayesian statistics. It is no coincidence that the early architects of this kind of modelling were not 
engineers and technicians but abstract mathematicians like Jon von Neumann and Warren Weaver.  
 
In translating social and political concerns into brute numbers, managerial governance revolutionised 
quantification. While the scientific managers of Taylorism had put a huge emphasis on measurement 
and numbers, systems analysis went well beyond anything that could be directly measured. It targeted 
aspects that could barely be observed, let alone counted. Though mathematically rigorous, this often 
involved an array of creative substitutions, using specific data as a means of assessing something far 
bigger, more diffuse, and harder to quantify.  
 
A notorious example was the use of body counts to assess the performance of the US Army in the 
Vietnam War4. But the emphasis on constructing social indicators as a means to assess policymaker 
performance and feed policymaking has endured ever since.  
 
This is seen today in the New Public Management reforms of the public sector. DEFRA, for example, 
uses a biodiversity offsetting metric to assess the ‘quality’ of natural habitats and land. The Prevent 
programme, meanwhile, collapses and transforms a multitude of social issues into a tick-box 
assessment of dangerous ‘radicalisation’.  
 
These metrics are well known to be imperfect. They only become useful for policymaking when 
augmented by the second feature of systems analysis: Game Theory. The Game Theory vision of a 
world of self-interested, competitive actors is often thought to be central to neoliberal ideology. But 
again, the focus on broad-brush ideology misses its importance. What matters more is what Game 
Theory meant for management.  
 
It framed organisational management in strategic terms. In contrast to Taylorist management, 
optimisation wasn’t the key problem managers were trying to solve, gaming was. Game Theory and its 
offshoot Rational Choice theory were both incubated at RAND and together radically remade what was 
expected of top-level managers. This was because they produced hugely counter-intuitive insights 
about strategy. Game Theory modelling ‘proved’ that what might be the best course of action in theory, 
could end up being suboptimal in practice when a competitor’s actions were accounted for. Just think 
of the Prisoners Dilemma: though co-operation would be optimal, the assumption of a gaming 
competitor casts the suboptimal, second-best option (cheat the opponent) as the most sensible choice. 
Managers had to redesign incentive structures around this notion of strategic, gaming individuals.  
 
Information management  
 
In trying to pull the expertise of complex modelling and strategic management out of the domain of 
wargaming and into civilian life, RAND researchers recast the notion of ‘information’. The managerial 
makeover of information was to prove crucial to the way frontline public service workers and users 
would later be compelled to generate huge reams of ‘data’ to feed back into organisational 
management. The reliance on data about performance to make policy (or strategic) decisions meant 
an explosion of audits, policy evaluations and performance management that were meant to give 
managers a perspective on the problems they faced.  
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Fitting what became a broader frustration with the ‘remote’ feel of postwar welfare state services, the 
idea was that the entire organisation – be it a hospital or a police force – and its users possessed 
information that could feed into better decision making.  
 
This information was then organised centrally through budgeting and in particular the updated 
technique of cost-benefit analysis (CBA). CBA made budgeting the centre of planning for the first time.  
 
In doing so budgeting was transformed from an accountant’s approach that tracks back in time, 
reporting resources used over a financial year, to a more forward-looking economist’s perspective. This 
meant repurposing CBA, which had emerged in the 1930s as a general formula to help planners 
organise large-scale infrastructure projects, into a more systematic means of comparing and evaluating 
proposed projects, expenditures and regulatory activities.  
 
CBA became a template to reflect on different policy options and remains so today. Though its insights 
are readily ignored (HS2, for example is repeatedly shown to be a less efficient spend than other 
options), it is nonetheless the framework by which policy implementation is conceptualised. Budgeting 
and decision making, previously distinct, were brought together.  
 
From warfare to welfare 
 
The technical foundation had been laid at RAND but it took Robert McNamara’s appointment as 
Secretary of Defence in 1960 to bring Cold War planning to the welfare state. McNamara took various 
RAND researchers with him into the public sector. Especially important were the economists Charles 
Hitch, David Novick and Alain Enthoven (who would go on to script Margaret Thatcher’s early versions 
of the ‘internal market’ in the NHS). Together they helped establish the Planning, Programming, and 
Budgeting System (PPBS). This was first used by McNamara in the defence department, but would 
later be redeployed in areas like health care, education, welfare and urban planning. 
 
The need for analytical expertise that came with PPBS drove the requirement for think tanks and 
research institutions whose funding and overt ideological orientation were provided by Hayek and his 
financial backers. Yet their influence can be best read in the way they helped transform Public Policy 
into a highly technical discipline with specialist schools.  
 
Though PPBS never delivered on its promise of rationally organising and optimising the social sector, 
similar budgetary planning techniques endured. In just the same way military strategists tried to decide 
on different weapons systems, these planning techniques later provided a way to decide, for example, 
what services a clinical commissioning group should ‘purchase’ to meet its region’s expected health 
needs. 
 
Indeed, the rhetoric of technocratic management and cold data analysis underpinned the 
depoliticisation of discussion around public sector management that we witness in the neoliberal age. 
By insisting governance was simply a data-led assessment of performance, responsibility for the 
continued failures could be passed onto lower orders, while responsibility for decision-making was 
reinforced at the top. 
 
The deployment of the new management science, with its suite of metrics and decision technologies 
enabled a new form of control at a distance. Top managers cast themselves as neutral arbiters, who 
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simply allocated resources to those who performed. And if that meant a hospital closing, or a university 
department shutting down, so be it. In that sense, the managed competition5 that characterises 
neoliberalism belongs firmly within a framework intended to empower managers, rather than enforce 
‘the market’.  
 
From the beginning, proponents of systems analysis had doubted the ability of market-like mechanisms 
to adequately assess the information it was given. Perhaps head teachers or hospital chiefs would 
exaggerate their costs and disrupt the proper functioning of an internal market? 
 
For that reason, public sector reform was built on new techniques of costing and performance 
assessment, so as to compensate for the inability of the market to correctly assess needs and costs. 
The point was not to ‘let’ competition choose winners and losers. Instead top managers expected to 
arrive themselves at a verdict on what performance indicators really meant and what their implications 
should be. The contradiction between this managed competition and the Hayekian scepticism of 
planning is stark.  
Social movements aren’t (just) social 
 
Progressive voices often look longingly at the MPS as a model to follow. With faith in neoliberal 
principles eroding, there is a wish for us too to have a body of theory ready to deploy. But the 
managerial story shows how neoliberal practices were encoded into the public sector first in 1960s 
America. Whatever the ideological commitments developed at the MPS, the actual lived practice of 
neoliberalism owes much more to the technical work done at RAND.  
 
It is an insight that muddies the story of the so-called shift that took place from the Keynesian post-war 
consensus to ‘free-market’ neoliberalism in the 1970s-1980s. It was not that voters gradually gave up 
on one established economic model and embraced something new. The social shift was less significant 
than the technical one.  
 
Progressives looking to construct a new normal must see technical innovation as key to the 
reconstruction of public and private institutions. Management technologies are not neutral, but neither 
are they wholly determined by the political context within which they developed. Rather, they are central 
to reforming the political contexts by enabling consensus building around shared targets, the relocation 
of decision making and control, and the reconfiguration of broader strategic aims. If a radically reformist 
party were to take office at the next election, it would need to draw on a new body of technical planning 
instruments to respond to intersecting ecological, economic and social challenges. 
  
At a national level, basing macroeconomic decision-making upon ecological macroeconomic models6 
could challenge current supply-side goals that presume rational gaming behaviour and legitimate the 
objectivity of current managerial planning. Going beyond a post-Keynesian focus on sustainable 
consumption, and 'green' investment, this would begin by shifting indicators towards social welfare and 
equitability. The European Commission’s ‘Beyond GDP’ initiative could provide one starting point here. 
  
At the institutional level, this shifting focus towards social welfare could be reinforced through two 
further developments. First, the current techniques of centralised managerial planning - targets, 
scenario development, dashboarding – could be replaced by sector-specific accountability frameworks, 
developed with unions so workers themselves create the criteria of assessing their sector. Deployed 
at the same time as a democratic drive to flatten management hierarchies along lines perhaps most 
famously laid out in the ‘Valve Employee Handbook’, this would enable worker ownership of decision 
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making design and control. 
  
Second, alternative budget allocation mechanisms could be used for funding allocation towards broad 
welfare goals. One possibility could be to expand quality of life metrics (QALYs) already used by NICE 
as a budget allocation mechanism in the NHS. Currently used to measure only health outcomes, a left 
managerial programme could build on existing attempts to expand QALYs through the inclusion of 
broader, non-clinical welfare factors and thereby leverage this technology into non-health budgetary 
planning. For example, in opposition to Universities Minister Sam Gyimah’s desire to develop a 
‘go.compare.the.university.com’ assessment that reduces educational quality to future earning 
potential, an expanded QALY could be used to assess degrees in terms of increasing overall social 
welfare. 
 
Given its managerial origin, countering neoliberalism means developing a programme for left 
management. This necessitates going beyond simply ownership reform. Instead, a left management 
programme would begin from the current suite of managerial technologies and simultaneously 
challenge and retrofit these to affect the institutional change necessary to address our most pressing 
concerns. 
1 We discuss mainly the application of the term neoliberalism to the West. The term 'neoliberalism' is 
often used to describe e.g. Arab states' relations with the IMF over the last 30 years, the policies that 
underlay the so-called Washington Consensus and the way that structural adjustment programs were 
implemented in Latin America, Asia and Africa through the 1990s. That is not the focus here. 
2 Knafo et al., ‘The Managerial Lineages of Neoliberalism’. 
3 Amadae, 'Rationalizing Capitalist Democracy'. 
4	Waitzkin, ‘The Strange Career of Managed Competition’.	
5 Enthoven, ‘The History and Principles of Managed Competition’.	
6 Rezai & Stagl, ‘Ecological macroeconomics: Introduction and review’. 
																																																						
